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Directorate of
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USSR: Demographic Trends and Ethnic Balance in the Non-Russian Republics

A Research Paper

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Intelligence**

USSR: Demographic Trends and Ethnic Balance in the Non-Russian Republics

A Research Paper

USSR: Demographic Trends and Ethnic Balance in the Non-Russian Republics

Summary

*Information available
as of 22 January 1990
was used in this report.*

Between 1979 and 1989 population growth and internal migration trends led to changes in the balance between ethnic Russians and the titular nationalities—the ethnic groups for which the Soviet republics are named—in all of the 14 non-Russian republics. These republics, in all of which ethnic Russians are a minority, contain nearly half of the total Soviet population.

According to 1989 Soviet census data, the total population of the USSR grew at an average annual rate of just under 1 percent—from 262.4 million to 286.7 million. The southern republics (in the Caucasus and Central Asia), however, grew by about 2 percent annually, largely because birthrates among the Muslim titular nationalities were over two times the Soviet national average. The western republics (the Baltics, Moldavia, Belorussia, and the Ukraine), by contrast, grew by an average annual rate of only 0.5 percent, reflecting low birthrates among the titular nationalities. The southern republics also experienced a net outmigration of more than 2 million people, while the Baltic republics had a net immigration of over a quarter of a million. Both of these migration flows were made up predominantly of Russians.

Shifts in the ethnic composition of the Central Asian and Baltic republics were among the largest. In Central Asia (including the Kazakh SSR), the proportion of Russians declined by some 2.5 to 4.4 percentage points between 1979 and 1989. During that time, the proportion of Russians in the Tajik SSR fell below 10 percent; now, only the Kirghiz and Kazakh SSRs have proportions that are above this level. Also, Kazakhs surpassed Russians as the largest minority in the Kazakh SSR. In the Baltics, the ethnic Russian proportions grew by between 0.5 and 2.4 percentage points. As a result, Latvians are in jeopardy of losing their majority status in the Latvian SSR; their proportion fell from 54 percent in 1979 to 52 percent in 1989. The other two Baltic groups—Estonians and Lithuanians—are not in danger of losing their majority standing.


During the 1990s the titular nationality proportions will continue to grow in the south but remain near current levels in the west while the Russian proportions grow slightly:

- The most significant changes could occur in the Baltics. Estonian and Lithuanian leaders are considering setting quotas on immigration, although only Estonia has a draft law. If the immigration quotas are successfully established they would slow Russian immigration and the decline of the titular proportions. As a result, the titular nationality proportions in their respective republics could be near or even above current levels by 2000. On the other hand, if immigration does not abate, Latvians could become a minority in their republic.
- The Muslim republics will continue to grow the fastest, because of the high rates of natural increase among the titular groups. If outmigration of ethnic Russians accelerates or remains near current levels, as is likely, Russian proportions will decline even more precipitately than during the 1980s. In fact, the Kirghiz could gain a majority in their republic by 1990, leaving the Kazakh SSR as the only republic in which the titular nationality is not a majority.
- Significant changes in the balance between the titular nationalities and ethnic Russians in the Belorussian, Ukrainian, and Moldavian SSRs are unlikely. The collective proportion of Belorussians, Ukrainians, and Russians—the largest Slavic groups in the USSR—could, however, drop from 69 percent in 1989 to 67 percent or less of the total Soviet population by 2000.
- In the Caucasus under any reasonable demographic scenario, the strong proportional domination of the titular groups is not likely to change and ethnic Russians will remain small minorities.

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Figure 1
Proportional Area Representation of Soviet Republic Populations^a



USSR: Demographic Trends and Ethnic Balance in the Non-Russian Republics

Introduction

The 14 non-Russian republics that surround the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR) make up about one-fourth of the Soviet landmass but contain nearly half of the USSR's total population, according to 1989 Soviet census data (see figure 1). Russians are a minority in these "peripheral" republics, even though they are the largest ethnic group that occupies the Soviet Union. Moreover, the titular nationalities that occupy these republics have, for the most part, maintained a strong sense of regional and cultural identity.¹


The data also show that the ethnic mix of the peripheral republics is changing, in part because of differences in population growth rates and in part because of migration. In some places these changes favor ethnic Russians; in others they favor non-Russian nationalities. In either case, these demographic shifts are contributing to growing nationality problems in the USSR: the growing Russian population in the Baltics, for example, has been used as a political issue by Baltic nationalists to fuel secessionist sentiment, while in Central Asia, Russians are fleeing a political and cultural climate that has grown hostile toward them. This paper uses 1989 Soviet census data, which are being released piecemeal, to examine these changes and explore their implications for the ethnic balance in the 1990s.

Overview of Demographic Change During the 1980s

Overall, the Soviet population grew from 262.4 million in 1979—the year the last Soviet census was conducted—to 286.7 million in 1989. This amounts to an average annual growth rate of just under 1 percent, about the same as for the 1970s and roughly comparable to that of the United States. The predominantly

¹ The term "titular nationality" refers to the ethnic group for which the given Soviet republic is named. For example, the Tajiks are the titular nationality in the Tajik SSR.


Figure 2
Soviet Population in Core Versus Periphery, 1959-89



non-Russian periphery grew more rapidly, however: in the aggregate these republics grew by 1.1 percent annually, from 124.9 million to 139.3 million, while the core Russian Republic grew by only 0.7 percent annually, from 137.5 million to 147.4 million (see foldout at end of text). Although these rates are more balanced than in past decades, the proportion of the Soviet population living in the peripheral republics continues to grow (see figure 2).

Changes in the ethnic composition of the Soviet population reflect this geographic pattern of growth. The recent census data show that, collectively, the

Figure 3
Ethnic Composition of Soviet
Population, 1959-89



non-Russian titular nationalities are growing more rapidly than ethnic Russians and that their share of the total Soviet population is expanding (see figure 3). During the 1980s the titular nationalities as a group grew by 1.3 percent annually and their proportion of the total Soviet population grew to about 40 percent. Meanwhile, the ethnic Russian population grew by an annual rate of 0.5 percent and its proportion of the total population declined to just under 51 percent. Collectively, the remainder of the nationalities in the USSR held at about 9 percent of the total population during the 1980s.

Regional Dynamics

These aggregate figures mask an important demographic contrast between the south and west. In the Caucasus and Central Asia, for example, population growth remains as high as in some neighboring Third World countries, while the Ukraine, Belorussia, Moldavia, and the three Baltic republics more closely resemble Europe.² In some cases population growth rates in the western non-Russian republics are below those of many developed nations.

The Southern Periphery

The southern republics, which historically have led the Soviet Union in population growth, continued to do so during the 1980s, growing by an average annual rate of about 2 percent. This is more than twice the national average and has remained constant since the early 1970s. The six predominantly Muslim republics (the five Central Asian republics and Azerbaijan) had the highest rates of population growth of the 15 Soviet republics.


High Rates of Natural Increase. Rapid population growth in the south is due largely to high rates of natural increase—births exceeding deaths. During the 1980s birthrates in the predominantly Muslim republics were about twice the national average, while death rates remained near the average. Fertility rates—the number of children being borne by women during their childbearing years—among these Muslim titular groups declined slightly.³

The combination of rising birthrates and declining fertility indicates that demographic momentum may be a driving force behind the rapid population growth

² For the purposes of this paper, we are including the Kazakh SSR in Central Asia, although only the Kirghiz, Uzbek, Turkmen, and Tajik SSRs make up the Central Asian economic region as defined by the Soviets. This amalgamation reflects the demographic and cultural similarities of these five nationality groups. The Caucasus republics include the Georgian, Armenian, and Azerbaijan SSRs.


³ For details on these rates see appendixes A and B.

Figure 4
Change in Number of Women
Ages 15 to 49, 1979-90^a



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Figure 5
Southern Republics Net
Migration, 1979-89^a



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in the Muslim republics.⁴ Indeed, during the 1980s the number of Muslim women in the childbearing ages (15 to 49 years old) grew by substantially more than among the other titular nationalities, according to current estimates (see figure 4). On the basis of experience in Third World countries, where this phenomenon typically occurs, countering this momentum will require a significant reduction in fertility for several decades. Muslim fertility rates declined slightly during the 1980s but still remain high by both world and Soviet standards, because

⁴ Demographic momentum refers to the tendency of a population to continue increasing because the number of women of childbearing age increases. By contrast, changes in fertility rates describe the extent to which each woman is having more or fewer children.

rural Muslims traditionally have large families and because birth control programs in Central Asia have been ineffective.

Outmigration of Nonindigenous Ethnic Groups. Between 1979 and 1989, Central Asia and the Caucasus experienced a combined net outmigration of more than 2.2 million people (see figure 5). The outmigration from Central Asia probably began in the late 1970s and has been accelerating, according to Soviet statistics. It reverses the experience of earlier decades when Russians migrated into the region, encouraged

Table 1
Russian Population in the Southern
Republics, 1979-89

	1979 Population			1989 Population		
	Total (thousands)	Russian (thousands)	Percent Russian	Total (thousands)	Russian (thousands)	Percent Russian
Georgian SSR	5,015	372	7.4	5,449	339	6.2
Armenian SSR	3,031	70	2.3	3,283	52	1.6
Azerbaijan SSR	6,028	475	7.9	7,029	392	5.6
Kazakh SSR	14,684	5,991	40.8	16,538	6,226	37.6
Turkmen SSR	2,759	349	12.6	3,534	334	9.5
Uzbek SSR	15,391	1,666	10.8	19,906	1,652	8.3
Kirghiz SSR	3,529	912	25.8	4,291	917	21.4
Tajik SSR	3,801	395	10.4	5,112	387	7.6

by Tsarist and Stalinist policies (continued by Khrushchev and Brezhnev) that were designed to modernize the agricultural and industrial base of the region. Outmigration from the Caucasus started in the 1960s.

Most of the people who left were from nonindigenous ethnic groups and probably ethnic Russians:

- Between 1979 and 1989 the number of Russians declined in all but the Kazakh and Kirghiz SSRs. This means that the exodus was so large that the natural increase of the 3 million Russians who remained was not enough to keep pace (see table 1).
- The number of Russians in the Kazakh and Kirghiz SSRs grew on average by only 0.3 percent and 0.05 percent annually. On average, the Russian population nationwide grew by 0.5 percent annually, so these low growth rates suggest that outmigration held down the growth of the Russian population in these republics as well.

At the same time, none of the titular nationalities from these regions have increased in substantially large numbers elsewhere in the USSR.

Much of this migration was probably the result of poor economic conditions and rising ethnic tension. Economic conditions in Central Asia have been

deteriorating for some time, and ethnic Europeans and nonindigenous Muslims face increasing hostility and violence from the titular nationalities, according to Soviet press reports. Recently, their uneasiness has been intensified by the implementation of new language laws requiring official use of the indigenous languages in republic governments and some industries.

Urban to Rural Migration. The 1989 census data indicate that, except for the Kazakh SSR, the proportion of the population of the Central Asian republics residing in urban areas declined or remained about the same during the 1980s, while in the rest of the USSR, the urban proportion grew (see table 2). These data, along with press reports suggesting that some indigenous people are returning to the countryside to be self-sufficient, indicate that urban-to-rural migration is occurring.

The Western Periphery

Populations in the western republics grew only 0.5 percent annually (or about half the national average) from 1979 to 1989. The Ukraine, "breadbasket" of

Table 2
Percent of Republic Populations Living
in Urban and Rural Areas, 1979-89

	1979		1989	
	Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural
USSR (national average)	62	38	66	34
RSFSR	69	31	74	26
Estonian SSR	70	30	72	28
Latvian SSR	68	32	71	29
Lithuanian SSR	61	39	68	32
Ukrainian SSR	61	39	67	33
Belorussian SSR	55	45	65	35
Moldavian SSR	39	61	47	53
Georgian SSR	52	48	56	44
Armenian SSR	66	34	68	32
Azerbaijan SSR	53	47	54	46
Kazakh SSR	54	46	57	43
Turkmen SSR	48	52	45	55
Uzbek SSR	41	59	41	59
Kirghiz SSR	39	61	38	62
Tajik SSR	35	65	33	67

the USSR, had the lowest growth rate of the 15 Soviet republics. The three Baltic republics also experienced slow growth during the 1980s, although overall rates for these three republics were only slightly less than for the entire USSR.

Low Rates of Natural Increase. The slow population growth in the west is largely the result of low birth rates. During the 1980s all of the western republics except Moldavia experienced birthrates below the Soviet national average. Moreover, low fertility rates compounded the low birthrates: except for Moldavia, women had barely enough daughters to "replace" themselves in the next generation.

In the Baltics, growth rates of the titular nationalities were much lower than the overall republic rates. Estonians and Latvians in particular grew only 0.09 and 0.14 percent per year, respectively. In absolute terms the number of Estonians in Estonia grew by only 15,500 during the past decade, while the total


population of the republic increased by over 101,000. Thus, the increase in the number of Estonians accounted for some 15 percent of the republic's total population increase. In Latvia the increase in the number of Latvians accounted for some 27 percent of that republic's total growth.

The Ukrainian SSR experienced the lowest rate of natural increase of all Soviet republics during most of the 1980s. Unlike the Baltics, where the titular nationalities exhibit very low growth rates, however, the ethnic Ukrainian growth rate was about the same as for the republic overall. In fact, during the past 10 years the number of Ukrainians increased by some 881,000—or about half of the republic's total growth—even though some Ukrainians moved to the Baltic and Russian republics. This reflects a significant regional variation within the republic: birthrates in the predominantly Ukrainian west were about 30 percent higher than the more ethnically diverse eastern region.

Immigration of Nonindigenous Ethnic Groups. Immigration accounted for a significant proportion of the growth reported in the Baltic republics during the 1980s. Between 1979 and 1989 the region experienced a net immigration of about 246,000 people (see figure 6), or about 45 percent of the overall population growth of the three republics; in the Latvian and Estonian SSRs, migration accounted for more than half of the population growth. Moscow used its system of work and residence permits, which controls the movement of Soviet citizens, to redress labor shortages in the Baltic republics—the result of past decisions to locate labor-intensive industries there despite low rates of natural increase among Balts.

Ethnic Russians and Ukrainians made up much of the influx into this region, although the proportion of each is not known. The Soviet census reports that the Russian population in the three republics grew at an average annual rate of about 1.2 percent, from 1.5 million to 1.7 million, and that the Ukrainian population grew at a 3.2-percent average annual rate, from about 134,000 to 184,000, between 1979 and 1989

Figure 6
Western Republics Net
Migration, 1979-89^a



^a Estimate.

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(see table 3). Although some of this growth results from the natural increase of Russians and Ukrainians already living in the Baltics, the fact that these growth rates are well above the national average for the two ethnic groups suggests that many immigrated.

Leaders in Lithuania and Estonia are considering immigration laws that would set quotas on permanent moves into these republics from other parts of the USSR, according to Soviet press reports. To date, however, only Estonia has a draft law. The most recent draft provides for a quota to be reset annually but does not specify an exact immigration level. A previous draft, however, indicates that the desired level may be about 25 percent of 1989 immigration. In the meantime, resolutions have been passed compelling enterprises in all three Baltic republics to pay a tax of 15,000 to 25,000 rubles (\$22,500 to \$37,500) for each immigrating worker and member of his family.

Key Provisions of the Estonian Draft Law on Immigration

The Estonian Draft Law on Immigration concerns entry into the Estonian SSR; it does not address outmigration or movement within the republic. Among its key provisions are that it:

- *Defines immigration to include residence or work of at least one month in the republic by persons who previously resided outside the republic.*
- *Establishes an Estonian SSR Migration Service to administer the law.*
- *Establishes that a quota on the number of immigrants will be set each calendar year by the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet at the recommendation of the Estonian SSR Government. Although the most recent draft does not establish a specific quota, a previous draft set the quota at 0.1 percent of the republic's total population per year.*
- *Requires potential immigrants to obtain residence and work permits through the Estonian SSR Migration Service. There will be three types of residence permits: temporary (which cover a specified period of time), fixed term (which covers the term of a specific activity), and permanent (which are issued to "persons having a close relative in the republic . . . or particularly necessary labor skills . . ."); and two types of work permits: fixed term and permanent.*

Immigration is far less of a factor in the other three western republics. The Ukrainian SSR did, however, experience a net gain—despite the fact that some Ukrainians moved in search of jobs and others fled after the Chernobyl' nuclear accident. The net influx of about 153,000 people, however, accounted for only 8 percent of the republic's total population growth between 1979 and 1989. Belorussia and Moldavia experienced slight net outmigration.

Table 3
Russian and Ukrainian Population in the
Baltic Republics, 1979-89

	Number of Russians (thousands)		Number of Ukrainians (thousands)		Average Annual Growth (percent)	
	1979	1989	1979	1989	Russian	Ukrainian
Total	1,533	1,725	134	184	1.2	3.2
Estonian SSR	409	475	36	48	1.5	2.9
Latvian SSR	821	906	67	92	1.0	3.2
Lithuanian SSR	303	344	31	44	1.3	3.6

Ethnic Balance in the Peripheral Republics

The census data released to date indicate that, except for the Kazakhs, titular nationality groups hold a majority in their respective republics (see figure 7). Lithuanians, Belorussians, Ukrainians, Georgians, Armenians, Azeris, and Uzbeks account for at least 70 percent of their republics' populations. Aside from the RSFSR, ethnic Russians do not hold a majority in any republic but do account for at least 20 percent of the population in the Estonian, Latvian, Ukrainian, Kazakh, and Kirghiz SSRs.

Since 1979, all Soviet republics have experienced changes in the ethnic composition of their populations as a result of the combined effects of differences in natural growth rates and the migration tendencies of the titular nationalities, including Russians (see figure 8). The shifts that occurred in Central Asia and the Baltics were the largest. Generally, the proportion of Russians dropped by 2.5 to 4.4 percentage points in Central Asia, while the titular proportions grew by 2.6 to 4.4 percentage points:

- The proportion of Russians in the Tajik SSR fell below 10 percent; only the Kazakh and Kirghiz SSRs have a proportion of Russians above that level.


- The Kirghiz are now a majority in their republic; their proportion grew from 48 percent of the republic's population in 1979 to 52 percent in 1989.
- Ethnic Russians also lost ground in Kazakhstan. Although no ethnic group holds a majority in the Kazakh SSR, Kazakhs surpassed Russians as the largest minority in the republic.

In the Baltic republics, demographic trends resulted in a rise that ranged from 0.5 to 2.4 percentage points in the proportion of Russians and a decline of 0.4 to 3.2 percentage points in the proportion of titular nationalities:

- The native majority in the Latvian SSR is now threatened. Latvians declined from 53.7 percent of the republic's population in 1979 to 52.0 percent in 1989. At the same time, the Russian proportion grew from 32.8 percent to 34.0 percent.
- Estonians now make up 61.5 percent of Estonia's population, down from 64.7 percent in 1979.

Figure 7
Comparative Soviet Nationalities
by Republic, 1989


Republic	Titular Republic Nationality (percent)				Total Republic Population (thousands) ^a
R.S.F.S.R.	-	82	Tatar	4	147,002
Estonian S.S.R.	62	30	Ukrainian	3	1,566
Latvian S.S.R.	52	34	Belorussian	5	2,667
Lithuanian S.S.R.	80	9	Polish	7	3,673
Belorussian S.S.R.	78	13	Polish	4	10,149
Ukrainian S.S.R.	73	22	Jewish	1	51,449
Moldavian S.S.R.	64	13	Ukrainian	14	4,332
Georgian S.S.R.	70	6	Armenian	8	5,396
Armenian S.S.R.	93	2	Azeri	3	3,304
Azerbaijan S.S.R.	83	6	Armenian	6	7,020
Kazakh S.S.R.	40	38	German	6	16,463
Turkmen S.S.R.	72	9	Uzbek	9	3,512
Tajik S.S.R.	62	8	Uzbek	24	5,090
Uzbek S.S.R.	71	8	Tajik	5	19,808
Kirghiz S.S.R.	52	21	Uzbek	13	4,258



The United States Government does not recognize the incorporation of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania into the Soviet Union. Boundary representation is not necessarily authoritative.

^aThe Soviet census reports two different figures for the total population of each republic. One is based on the number of people in the republic on the day the census was conducted. This map uses the other, which is based on the number of people reporting the republic as their place of permanent residence.

Figure 8
Change in Ethnic Proportions in
Soviet Republics, 1979-89



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The titular proportions in some urban areas are even lower. Press reports indicate that they are below 50 percent in all three republic capitals, for example.

Outlook: Ethnic Balances in the 1990s

Although it is difficult to predict with any precision the ethnic composition of the non-Russian republics at the end of the 1990s, we can project probable trends. Significant changes could occur in the Baltics. If immigration laws similar to the Estonian model are enacted in the next few years, the decline of the titular nationalities relative to Russians could be reduced significantly—perhaps allowing titular proportions to grow slightly above current levels by 2000, depending on variations in fertility rates among the various nationalities. Conversely, if Russian immigration is not slowed, Latvians could be a minority in their republic by the end of the decade; Estonians and Lithuanians, however, would maintain majorities in their republics.

Muslims will continue to be the fastest growing of the titular nationalities during the 1990s. At the same time, Russian outmigration from the south will probably continue to accelerate. Thus, high rates of population growth, along with accelerating outmigration of nonindigenous populations, are likely to strengthen the Muslim demographic preponderance in the southern republics by at least as much as during the 1980s. Even if outmigration slows, titular proportions would still rise because of natural increase.

Growth trends also suggest that the Muslim population in the USSR overall will become younger in the next decade. Based on current trends, the proportion of the Muslim populations 15 to 24 years old will probably rise above 20 percent in the 1990s—a development that has been associated with heightened societal unrest elsewhere in the world.

Significant shifts in the ethnic balance of the Moldavian, Ukrainian, and Belorussian Republics appear less likely, however. This is mostly because neither migration nor natural increase play a large role in the

ethnic balance of the republics. Birthrates among the titular nationalities are near the level of the nonindigenous population, and net migration rates have been low. The titular groups already hold a demographically dominant position in these republics. Overall, however, the combined proportion of Slavs—Belorussians, Ukrainians, and Russians—in the USSR's total population will fall from 69 percent in 1989 to 67 percent or less by the year 2000.⁵

⁵ The ethnic Russian proportion of the Soviet population will fall to below 50 percent by the mid-1990s.

Finally, in the Caucasus region we cannot envision a reasonable scenario that would alter the strong proportional domination of the titular groups. Ethnic Russians there will remain a relatively insignificant minority, particularly in Armenia and Azerbaijan. Even in the extremely unlikely event that ethnic Russians began migrating into this region in large numbers, we cannot envision a significant increase in the Russian proportion by 2000.

Appendix A

Growth Statistics for the Soviet Republics, 1979-89

Per 1,000 population

	Births 1988	Deaths 1988	Natural Increase 1988	Net Migration 1979-89
USSR	18.8	10.1	8.7	NA ^a
RSFSR	16.0	10.7	5.3	-0.1
Estonian SSR	15.9	11.8	4.1	3.6
Latvian SSR	15.4	12.1	3.3	3.6
Lithuanian SSR	15.3	10.2	5.1	2.8
Ukrainian SSR	14.5	11.7	2.8	0.3
Belorussian SSR	16.0	10.1	5.9	-0.1
Moldavian SSR	20.9	9.7	11.2	-1.4
Georgian SSR	17.3	9.0	8.3	-1.0
Armenian SSR	21.6	10.3 ^b	11.3	-9.8
Azerbaijan SSR	26.5	6.8	19.7	-4.1
Kazakh SSR	24.6	7.7	16.9	-5.0
Turkmen SSR	36.0	7.8	28.2	-2.7
Uzbek SSR	35.1	6.8	28.3	-2.9
Kirghiz SSR	31.2	7.4	23.8	-4.0
Tajik SSR	40.0	7.0	33.0	-2.3

^a Not available.

^b The Armenian death rate doubled in 1988, probably due at least in part to the December 1988 earthquake. In previous years the death rate was between 5 and 6 per 1,000 population.

Appendix B

Total Fertility Rates of the Titular Nationalities ^a

	1978-79	1983-84
USSR (national average)	2.29	2.41
Estonian	2.01	2.13
Latvian	1.87	2.10
Lithuanian	2.07	2.09
Ukrainian	1.97	2.10
Belorussian	2.06	2.14
Moldavian	2.55	2.71
Georgian	2.29	2.28
Armenian	2.46	2.42
Azeri	3.48	2.98
Kazakh	4.40	3.96
Turkmen	6.94	6.09
Uzbek	6.37	5.67
Kirghiz	6.39	5.83
Tajik	7.29	6.60

Note: Replacement fertility rate = 2.11.

^a Total fertility rates in this table represent the number of children a woman will bear over her reproductive lifetime.

